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Abstract: Safety and Security have always been 
considered separately in most industrial process. 
Actually, there is a growing consensus that for many 
applications, Safety as well as Security demands 
have to be observed in a coherent manner. Risk 
analysis to counter malicious attacks can be also 
reused with appropriate modification for unplanned 
system failure. 
Keywords: safety, security, convergence. 
1. Introduction 
For numerous years the “Software Safety” and 
“Information Systems Security” communities have 
been following their own ways with a few 
interactions. 
 
This independence emerges when reviewing the 
standards issued by both communities until 2000-
2005. Among them two major standards are well 
representative of each community: 
• “Common Criteria” for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation [1], 
• “ISO 61508” for Functional safety of 
electrical / electronic / programmable 
electronic safety-related systems [2]. 
 
To roughly summarize the differences between the 
two approaches described in these two standards, 
we can say that Information Security Community 
recommends a combination between “system 
specification audit” (inheriting from the historical 
MARION method developed by the CLUSIF in 1983) 
and “implementation requirement” for security, while 
functional safety approach is based on an adaptation 
of usual product risk management techniques 
associated to process requirements. 
From their side “usual” product risk management 
techniques for programmable systems are well 
defined into the ISO/CEI 15026 standard [4]. 
 
This differentiation between security and safety is 
nowadays becoming unbearable because both 
aspects are more and more merged in modern 
complex systems such as Naval System for the 
particular case of DCNS or in other embedded 
communication systems (in Nuclear Power Plants for 
example). This is particularly true for complex 
system based mostly on software. 
 
Recently, in 2008, a new international standard 
ISO/IEC 2700X [3] has been issued. This standard 
describes an information security risk management 
process and associated actions to help organizations 
of all types that are concerned by threats that could 
compromise their information security. And for the 
first time the security approach required by the 
standard ISO/IEC 27005 has many communalities 
with the risk management approaches required by 
the ISO/IEC 61508 family standards and that are the 
main topic of the ISO/IEC 15026 standard [4]. 
 
This convergence is worth to be mentioned and is 
the subject of this paper. Actually the harmonization 
of security and safety studies can be a source of 
productivity improvement for many companies. 
 
The next sections will successively: 
• briefly describe the security and safety 
standards that are examined in this paper, 
• enlighten  the communalities that can be 
found in both security and safety new 
standards, 
• propose a generalised process approach that 
is consistent with most of the safety and 
security standards requirements, 
• conclude by showing which benefits many 
companies could gain in harmonising their 
safety and security organisations (through 
DCNS perspective). 
2. Short description of the selected security and 
safety standards  
2.1 ISO 27005 standard 
The ISO 27005 is the prime 27000 series standard 
covering information security risk management. It 
has been published in June 2008. 
This standard provides guidelines for information 
security risk management (ISRM) in an organization, 
specifically supporting the general concepts of 
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information security management system specified 
by ISO 27001.  
The ISO 27005 standard does not provide neither 
recommend a specific methodology. It is up to the 
organization to define its approach that will depend 
upon a number of factors, such as the actual scope 
of the Information Security Management System 
(ISMS), or the industry/commercial sector. The 
EBIOS 27005 methodology could be used for this 
purpose. [X] 
 
The ISO 27005 standard is based on a risk 
management approach, i.e. it specifies a structured, 
systematic and rigorous risk management process 
from analyzing risks to creating the risk treatment 
plan. 
 
The information security risk management process 
consists of: 
• Context Establishment: intends to define the 
risk management’s boundary 
• Risk Assessment: 
o Risk Analysis (Risk Identification & 
Estimation phases): intends to 
define the assets, the threats and 
vulnerabilities and concludes by 
evaluating the risk level. 
o Risk Evaluation: takes into account 
the objectives of the organization 
and prioritizes the risks. 
• Risk Treatment: to reduce, retain, avoid or 
transfer the risks. 
• Risk Acceptance: to formally record the 
decision to accept the residual risks. 
 
In parallel support processes are described, such as: 
• Risk Communication: for exchanging and/or 
sharing information about risk between the 
decision makers and other stakeholders. 
• Risk Monitoring and Review: to maintain an 
overview of the complete risk snapshot. 
 
2.2 ISO/IEC 61508 family standards  
The Created in European version by CENELEC in 
2002 as EN 61508, the IEC 61508 standard has its 
origins in the process control industry sector. It is 
intended to be a basic functional safety standard 
applicable to all kinds of industry. This standard sets 
out a generic approach for all safety lifecycle 
activities for systems comprised of electrical and/or 
electronic and/or programmable electronic 
components (electrical/electronic/ programmable 
electronic systems (E/E/PESs)) that are used to 
perform safety functions. 
Functional safety is defined in the IEC 61508 
standard as: “part of the overall safety relating to the 
EUC (Equipment Under Control) and the EUC 
control system which depends on the correct 
functioning of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, 
other technology safety-related systems and external 
risk reduction facilities.” 
The safety lifecycle described in the standard covers 
all activities needed for an E/E/PES system 
development and use, going from initial design until 
decommissioning through development, installation, 
and operation phases. 
The safety approach is based on risk prevention and 
the system SIL (Safety Integrity Level) determination 
classified on a 4 degrees scale going from SL1 (the 
less critical) to SIL4 (the most critical). 
 
For the 2 more critical levels (SIL 3 and SIL4), the 
standard is very stringent regarding the number and 
variety of techniques that must be applied. Moreover 
these techniques are not always consistent and 
often very costly to operate in usual industrial 
contexts. When the system is not a pure safety 
system (i.e. implementing a “safety” dedicated 
function such as “nuclear emergency stop” for 
example) but only a safety-related system (as in 
numerous embedded automotive systems for 
example), the notion of safety function described in 
the ISO/CEI 61508 standard is not very easy to 
handle. 
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Figure 1 :Safety requirements
 
As it was designed to be a generic standard, the IEC 
61508 standard has quickly led to several derivatives 
more adapted to specific areas. 
This has resulted in what we call the “ISO/IEC 61508 
family” that is regularly enriched and consists today 
among others in: 
• the CEI 61511 standard for industrial 
processes, 
• the CEI 61513 standard for the nuclear 
sector, 
• the CEI 62061 standard for the safety of 
machines, 
• the CEI 62304 [5]  standard for medical 
device software, 
• the future ISO 26262 [6] standard for the 
automotive sector … 
2.3 ISO/IEC 15026 standard 
The ISO/IEC 15026 standard introduces the 
concepts of software integrity levels and software 
integrity requirements. It defines the concepts 
associated with integrity levels, defines the 
processes for determining integrity levels and 
software integrity requirements, and places 
requirements on each process. 
It does not prescribe a specific set of integrity levels 
or software integrity requirements that can be 
established either on a project by project basis or for 
a specific sector. 
The risk management process required by the 
ISO/IEC 15026 consists of: 
• Risk Analysis: covering threat identification, 
frequency analysis, consequence analysis 
and leading to risk calculation. 
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• Risk Evaluation: concluding with tolerability 
decisions. 
• Risk Control: consisting in System Integrity 
Level determination, software integrity level 
determination and concluding with software 
integrity requirements determination.  
 
2.4 Advantages of ISO/IEC 15026 versus ISO/IEC 
61508 
 
Using the ISO/IEC 15026 standard instead of the 
ISO/IEC 61508 standard brings the advantage to 
avoid the burden of the second standard as 
described in paragraph 2.2. 
In the ISO/IEC 15026 standard, an integrity 
assurance authority is indeed in charge of assessing 
the compliance of the system with its integrity 
requirements. 
Once the safety integrity level determination has 
been correctly done and assessed by the integrity 
assurance authority, each industrial may define the 
techniques that are the most appropriate to its 
context. The only requirements to fulfil is again to get 
the assessment of the integrity assurance authority 
on the set of techniques proposed to achieve the 
degree of confidence necessary for each integrity 
level. 
 
3. Comparison between ISO 27005 and ISO 
15028 
The first important communality to highlight is that 
both standards are fundamentally based on a “risk 
management oriented” approach. 
This ISO 27005 summarizes its approach in the 
following figure: 
. 
 
Figure 2 : ISO 27 005 process
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And besides, the ISO/CEI 15026 standard describes 
its approach through the following figure: 
 
Figure 3 : ISO 15026 Standard
Another important communality is that the processes 
required by both standards are very similar and can 
be easily merged into a unique “generalized safety 
process” as it is explained in the following section. 
1. Generalised safety process 
In order to harmonize the safety and security 
processes at DCNS, a “generalized safety process” 
has been designed. The main phases of this process 
are: 
• Definition and scheduling of safety activities 
• Preliminary hazard analysis 
• Risk analysis during the specification phase 
• Risk analysis during the design phase 
• Transfer of safety requirements 
• Verification of safety requirements fulfilment 
on components 
• Verification of the test phases 
• Closure of the safety process 
All activities required by both ISO/IEC 15026 and 
ISO 27005 are covered by the “generalized safety 
process”. The traceability is given in the following 
comparative figure: 
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Figure 4 : Convergence between ISO27005 and ISO15026 
 
Verification of safety requirements 
fulfilment on components 
Verification of the test phases 
Closure of the safety process 
Risk communication 
Risk monitoring and review 
Risk acceptance 
Support Processus 
Risk evaluation 
Risk Evaluation 
Risk Analysis Preliminary hazard analysis 
Risk analysis during the 
specification phase 
Risk analysis during the design  
phase 
 
Generalized safety process ISO/IEC 15026 process 
Definition and scheduling of safety 
activities  
Threat identification 
Consequence analysis 
Risk calculation 
Software integrity requirements 
determination 
ISO 27005 process 
Context establishment 
Risk estimation 
Risk treatment 
Risk identification 
Risk assessment 
Risk evaluation 
Risk estimation 
Risk treatment 
Risk evaluation 
Frequency analysis 
Risk tolerability decision 
Risk tolerability decision 
Risk control 
System integrity level detremination 
Software integrity level 
determination 
Transfer of safety requirements 
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The previous diagram show clearly the convergence 
announced between ISO 27005 and IEC 15026. 
That convergence enables the risk manager to 
operate as well in the security point of view during 
the analysis to prevent malicious attacks as in the 
safety point of view to prevent from unplanned 
system failure. 
 
It is however important to notice that this parallelism 
between security and safety standards has been 
made feasible only provided that a common 
vocabulary is set up between the two areas. For 
example: 
 
• « high level assessment » described in § 8.1 
of ISO 27005 is comparable to « risk 
analysis during the specification phase », 
• « next iteration further in depth » also 
described in § 8.1 of ISO 27005 is 
associated to « risk analysis during the 
design phase », 
• the concepts of “primary assets” and 
“supporting assets “ used by ISO 27005 are 
equivalent to the concepts of “functions” and 
“organs” used in system engineering, 
• etc. 
 
From a process point of view; the ISO/IEC 15026 
does not require support processes such as 
« communication » or « monitoring and review » in 
the ISO 27005 standard. However these processes 
are taken into account by the ISO/IEC 61508 family 
standards. 
Inversely some other useful support process such as 
“change management” should be taken into account 
into the ISO 27005 standard. 
4. Benefits of the convergence 
As new technologies become increasingly complex, 
the need to merge security and safety processes in 
a common analysis process is crucial. 
The convergence is mainly useful to reduce analysis 
time and cost for security and safety. To be efficient, 
only one engineer should work on both. He should 
have both expertises to achieve his task.  Indeed, 
the analysis tasks for a system require being aware 
of all specification and conception data. This 
requirement takes a long time, especially in a 
complex system. This task done for safety is so not 
required for security. 
 
An other benefit is the simplification of the project 
organization. The process is unique between safety 
and security. The interlocutor is also unique. 
 
The third advantage is the proposition of 
recommendation coherent between the safety 
needed and the security needed. For example, in 
naval ship, a local must be always closed if there are 
some sensitive cryptographic algorithms processing 
inside. This is a main security requirement often 
proposed as recommendation. In the safety point of 
view, in certain condition, the door of the local will be 
demanded to be kept opened to permit the 
evacuation in case of fire. These two 
recommendations are antinomic but expected. Only 
the risk analysis even though in security and safety 
point of view will find the recommendation so 
needed.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided guidelines to manage to 
create a unique process for safety and security. This 
process give immediate and long term benefits for 
companies. DCNS uses this approach without 
trouble for all project demanding safety and security 
analysis. In the future, we expected a more 
pronounced convergence by the emergence of a 
unique and global standard addressing security and 
safety. 
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8. Glossary 
Acronyms Significations 
CEI / IEC Commission Electronique Internationale 
/ International Electronical Commission 
CLUSIF CLUb des Systèmes d’Information 
Français 
CMS Combat Management Systems 
DCNS Direction de Constructions Navales 
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Acronyms Significations 
E/E/PE Electrical/Electronic/ Programmable 
electronic 
ISO International Standard Organisation 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
 
